Policy Memos | Аналитические записки

Policy Memo # 460
Samuel Greene 22 Feb 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) Within the next 24 months, the international sanctions imposed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea and the instigation of conflict in the Donbas will likely weaken—despite the near certainty that neither Moscow’s policies toward Ukraine nor its domestic politics will have significantly improved in Europe’s view. The ascent of Donald Trump in the United States, the emergence of “Brexit,” the...
Policy Memo # 459
Volodymyr Dubovyk 16 Feb 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) To ask whether Ukraine is a client state of the United States might seem provocative. In the opinion of some, being a “client state” is negative, implying that the state is no longer free, particularly in the international arena—akin to being a colony. This negative connotation resonates with the message coming from the Kremlin (and Russian propaganda) that Washington is somehow in control of Ukraine, dictating...
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Policy Memo # 458
Olexiy Haran, Mariia Zolkina 16 Feb 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) Before 2014, the majority of Ukrainians did not view the goal of European integration as a “national idea.” Even so, most Ukrainians had positive views about developing relations with and integrating into the EU. And even though former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych refused to accept the idea of joining NATO, he officially maintained EU integration as a priority. In fact, the Yanukovych administration helped...
Policy Memo # 457
Polina Sinovets 16 Feb 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) The official inauguration of a European missile defense (MD) site in Romania in the spring of 2016 triggered a new wave of anti-Western rhetoric in Russia. President Vladimir Putin declared that the system being deployed in Romania and Poland was not defensive, but part of the U.S. strategic nuclear capability. Therefore, he said in May 2016, Moscow “will be forced to think about neutralizing the...
Policy Memo # 456
Mikhail Alexseev 06 Feb 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) Signed in February 2015, the Minsk II ceasefire accord strengthened the original protocol provisions to grant partial sovereignty (“special status”) to the self-proclaimed, Russia-backed governments of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR, LNR). Minsk II was inked at the same time that Russia’s regular, irregular, and mercenary forces exploited Kyiv’s compliance with Minsk I (September 2014) to...
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Policy Memo # 455
Mariya Omelicheva 31 Jan 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) The topic of collective responses to terrorism, extremism, and transnational organized crime has long dominated discussions within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). However, they routinely fail to address the multiple and complex ways that these activities intersect. This is a serious oversight. It makes collective security initiatives incapable of appropriately...
Policy Memo # 454
Arkady Moshes 30 Jan 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) The Ukraine crisis became a major driver of the centrifugal relationship between Russia and the European Union, but it was not the starting point. The relationship had been essentially stagnant since the EU eastern enlargement at the beginning of the 2000s and Ukraine’s Orange revolution of 2004. Significant trade volumes could not compensate for the increasing geopolitical rivalry between Brussels and Moscow. The EU has...
Policy Memo # 453
Serghei Golunov 18 Jan 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) The political and economic relationship between Russia and China has been intensifying over the past decade, particularly as Moscow has attempted to “pivot to the East.” While their bilateral political and trade relations have experienced a recent honeymoon of sorts, Russia’s largely resource-based economy and economic downturn keeps its potential far behind China’s. One way to analyze the complex China-Russia...
Policy Memo # 452
Mark Kramer 13 Jan 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) The release on January 6 of an unclassified version of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s report describing efforts by Russian security services to influence last year’s U.S. presidential campaign in favor of Donald Trump evoked a sense of deja vu. Despite the advent of cyberwarfare, the Russian government’s attempts to sway the U.S. election in 2016 were strikingly reminiscent of Soviet “active measures”...
Policy Memo # 451
Scott Radnitz 29 Nov 2016
(PONARS Policy Memo) The Central Asian states have endeavored over the past two decades to maintain the appropriate amount of distance from the regional hegemon, Russia. They have sought to balance good relations with it while preserving internal legitimacy and sovereignty. Their approach has hinged on three factors: (1) their structural dependence on Russia; (2) the level of Russia’s insistence on conformity to its policies; and (3) their...

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